File Name: science and technology current affairs 2018 .zip
War made the state, and the state made war, but does this statement hold true today? Will it apply in the future?
War made the state, and the state made war, but does this statement hold true today? Will it apply in the future? The consensus is that the absence of major war within the western world, post , did cause the war—state relationship to change, but each became significantly less important to the other. This article argues that the relationship was closer and deeper than has been assumed. It proposes that the peculiar strategic conditions created by the nuclear age caused states to wage a ritualistic style of war, in which demonstration rather than the physical application of violence became increasingly important.
Within this setting, the state drove the process of technological innovation in defence to its limits in an effort to demonstrate its military superiority. This massive peacetime investment in defence technology exerted a huge impact on the character of war, which led to new strategic forms.
However, most importantly, the diffusion of military technology also affected the wider economy and society, leading to a form of internal power transition within states. The author speculates on how these elemental forces will play out in the future, what will happen to war and the state, and whether we will reach a point where war leads to the unmaking of the state.
This article explores the changing relationship between war and the state in the western world since the end of the Second World War. Specifically, it analyses how that relationship evolved during and after the Cold War, and extrapolates from current trends to speculate what impact war will have on the future evolution of the state. Our understanding of the connection between war and the state assumes that war played an instrumental role in the formation of the state in the early modern period.
The synergistic relationship established at that time then blossomed over the next four centuries, during which both state and war grew exponentially. However, this expansion was checked by the declining incidence and scale of interstate war after , which eventually allowed new political and economic priorities to emerge that resulted in the reshaping of, and a changed role for, the state.
The article presents an alternative view of the war—state relationship in the post-Second World War era. It does not challenge the logic that the decline in war affected the war—state connection. Instead, it demonstrates how the complexity of war after led to a deep but more subtle interaction, which had a profound effect on war, the state and society in the western world.
While I do not challenge the premise that a range of factors played a role in shaping the connection between war and the state, the precise interaction and relative importance of these forces have altered over time, and this has caused the demands of war on the state to shift in significant ways. In the period under scrutiny in this article, I argue that the role of technology in war increased dramatically because of the nuclear revolution.
In this setting, technological development reduced the opportunities for war, but the arms race it generated also brought into being new technologies, and these facilitated new forms of conflict. These developments affected our understanding of war's character and its interaction with the state.
Military history provides a rich literature on war and technology, but its focus has tended to be on the importance of technology in helping militaries win wars. However, my aim is to turn this domain upside down and explore not just how the world has changed and continues to change war, but how the war—technology dynamic has changed the world, in what might be described as a form of positive feedback.
To this end, I expand and build on the historical overview presented by William McNeill and Maurice Pearton of the financial and technical linkages forged between war and the state starting in the late nineteenth century.
Most importantly, this construct allows the contemporary war—state relationship to be viewed through a different lens, one that sees a stronger, darker and more damaging connection than is generally recognized.
In addressing this issue, I have relied on the experiences of the United States and United Kingdom, as representative examples of western states, to support the propositions set out here. Most importantly, in both cases the state played a leading role in promoting defence research after ; technology was of central importance in their strategic frameworks, and continues to be so today.
Second, both states consciously exploited defence technology to promote wider economic prosperity. I recognize that attempts to look into the future carry a great deal of risk. I am aware of this risk and explain below how I have taken it into account. The only general point I would make here is that history also shows that, sometimes, military forecasting is successful. I have looked at these examples and drawn on their methodologies.
In sum, the central argument of this article is that, after , technology acted as a vital agent of change in the war—state relationship, and eventually the ripples of this change spread throughout society. To illustrate this point, you have only to look at the ubiquitous smartphone and the genesis of technologies produced by defence research that made it possible. This capability has in turn affected the conduct of war; and this has affected the state.
Thus the smartphone provides just one significant example of how technology and war are shaping the state and the world we live in. The article is divided into three parts. The first explores the war—state relationship and the factors that shaped it during the Cold War.
It explains why technological innovation became so important in war, and how this imperative influenced both our understanding of war and the interaction between war and the state. The second section examines why the imperative for technological innovation persisted, and why the war—state infrastructure survived in the post-Cold War era. Finally, the third section explores how current trends might influence the war—state relationship in the future. Clausewitz missed the importance of technology as a variable in his analysis of war.
The first was the impact of the Industrial Revolution. This period of sustained and rapid technological innovation eventually affected all areas of human activity, including war. Evidence of the increased pace in technological change can be seen from Schumpeter's economic analysis of capitalism and its relationship to technology. In his view, four long economic cycles in the Industrial Revolution led to ground-breaking changes in the mode of production in little more than a hundred years.
However, this situation slowly changed such that the demands for military technology eventually shaped the wider context in which it existed—which brings us to the second reason why the importance of technology increased. O'Neill demonstrates how the state began to assume a role as a sponsor of technological innovation in defence in the late nineteenth century as the military became increasingly interested in the exploitation of technology.
The demands of war also resulted in the state expanding into the provision of education and health care to ensure the population was fit to wage war.
Even liberal Britain succumbed to this view of the state. The advent of the nuclear age precipitated a profound change in the organization and conduct of war. Hables Gray asserts that marks the dividing line between modern war and the birth of what he terms post-modern war. This new strategic setting precipitated what Holsti described as the diversification of warfare; and this in turn resulted in a blurring of the line between peace and war as governments employed a range of means to achieve their policy goals below the threshold of general war.
Most importantly, the forms of war proliferated as new ways were devised to employ war as a political tool in a nuclear world. However, in examining the post war—state relationship in the West, we need to revise our understanding of war so that it extends beyond physical violence and bloodshed.
Russian military reflections on the Cold War reveal an interesting narrative that reinforces this expansion of war beyond its traditional domain. According to this analysis, the Soviet Union lost the Cold War because it was defeated by non-military means employed by its enemy that focused on psychological, political, information, social and economic attacks against the Soviet state.
Technology played a vital role in facilitating this process, for example via the communications revolution, which facilitated the waging of activities such as political warfare. However, the most salient aspect of the Cold War was the discourse of deterrence.
Within this context, the rituals of war in terms of organizing, preparing and demonstrating an ability to fight nuclear war in the hope of deterring potential opponents and thereby preventing the possibility of war became substitutes for organized violence. Small wars happened on the periphery of the US and Soviet geopolitical space, but in the core region, a different kind of cognitive and cultural violence emerged, which can be seen as a form of war.
How, then, did technology fit into this new discourse of war? According to Buzan, because nuclear deterrence relied on anticipated weapons performance, it became sensitive to technical innovation, which meant the state had to respond to technological change by investing in defence research to maintain the credibility of its deterrent.
The role of the state was vital because it was the state that provided the critical financial resources required to take embryonic technologies and develop them at a speed unlikely to be matched by the civilian market. The end of the Cold War resulted in a significant fall in defence expenditure.
Equally importantly, the state reduced its participation in sustaining defence research and allowed the private sector to play a more prominent role in defence production. In the UK, where the nationalized defence industries had already been privatized in the s, this process was extended to include the sale of the state's defence research and development arm. This change in industrial and technological policy reflected a broader adjustment as the state lost its position in the vanguard of the technological revolution.
Since the start of the Cold War, US government-funded defence research had given rise to technologies such as the internet, virtual reality, jet travel, data joining, closed-circuit TV, global positioning, rocketry, remote control, microwaves, radar, global positioning, networked computers, wireless communications and satellite surveillance. The critical difference between innovation in the defence market and its civilian counterpart was that, in the latter, high rates of consumption led to product and process innovation by companies.
As a result, civil technology providers increasingly took the lead in the information revolution. Given this new dynamism, military power relied increasingly on the existing pool of technological knowledge within the broader economy.
The increasing emphasis on quality in war also generated greater complexity during operations. This trend facilitated the rise of private military companies in the post-Cold War era and resulted in western states increasingly subcontracting the provision of internal and external security to the private sector. However, in spite of the end of the Cold War, western governments continued to have an appetite for technological innovation and its integration into ever more complex weapons.
Indeed, an important feature of post-modern war was that machines assumed an unprecedented importance in the post-Cold War era. In postmodern war, the central role of human bodies in war is being eclipsed rhetorically by the growing importance of machines. The First Gulf War was an important marker because it revealed to western society the power of technology, at least in a conventional war.
As Freedman observed, this conflict resolved the high-tech versus low-tech debate which had persisted throughout the Cold War.
Technology allowed western states to engage targets at long range with high accuracy, but at no risk to those firing the weapons—something that became very useful in an era of wars of choice. Technological innovation in the techniques of war allowed the state to continue using force as an instrument of policy, especially in those instances where there was no clear political consensus on taking military action.
The idea of an MIC persists today. For example, David Keen points to the powerful economic functions fulfilled by the war on terror, which he believed explained the persistence of a war based on counterproductive strategy and tactics. During this period technology was viewed almost as a silver bullet. As such, it provided a neat answer to complex questions posed by the human and physical terrain of war.
Most importantly, for a brief moment at least, it allowed western states to reimagine decisive victories and tidy peace settlements. How, then, will predicted developments in technology shape the future of war and the state? This is a question that is causing much anxiety in both academic and policy-making circles. As Freedman points out, the future is based on decisions that have yet to be made in circumstances that remain unclear to those looking into a crystal ball.
Cohen has pointed out that debates on the future of war often suffer from being technologically sanitized, ignoring politics and therefore lacking a meaningful context. I address these problems in two ways. The first is to follow the advice offered by the sociologist Michael Mann, who observed that no one could accurately predict the future of large-scale power structures like the state; the most one can do is provide alternative scenarios of what might happen given different conditions, and in some cases to arrange them in order of probability.
To this end, I adopt here the Clausewitzian framework of analysis which Colin Gray employed in considering future war. As he explains:. Both avenues must be travelled here. Future warfare viewed as grammar requires us to probe probable and possible developments in military science, with reference to how war actually could be waged. From the perspective of policy logic we need to explore official motivations to fight.
In exploring the future relationship between war and the state, and the role played by technology, two possible visions are presented here. The first explores the continuation of the status quo and represents the default setting of both the UK and US governments with regard to the future.
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Ее всегда поражало, что даже в преддверии катастрофы Стратмор умел сохранять выдержку и спокойствие. Она была убеждена, что именно это качество определило всю его карьеру и вознесло на высшие этажи власти. Уже направляясь к двери, Сьюзан внимательно посмотрела на ТРАНСТЕКСТ.
Рана была небольшой, скорее похожей на глубокую царапину. Он заправил рубашку в брюки и оглянулся. Позади уже закрывались двери.
Фонд электронных границ сразу увидел в этом конфликт интересов и всячески пытался доказать, что АНБ намеренно создаст несовершенный алгоритм - такой, какой ему будет нетрудно взломать. Чтобы развеять эти опасения, конгресс объявил, что, когда алгоритм будет создан, его передадут для ознакомления лучшим математикам мира, которые должны будут оценить его качество. Команда криптографов АНБ под руководством Стратмора без особого энтузиазма создала алгоритм, который окрестила Попрыгунчиком, и представила его в конгресс для одобрения.
- Проститутка, что .
- Абсолютно. Скажи папе, что все в порядке. Но нутром он чувствовал, что это далеко не .
Повернувшись в полном отчаянии, она ожидала услышать шум смертельной борьбы на полу, но все было тихо. Все вдруг сразу же смолкло: как если бы Хейл, сбив коммандера с ног, снова растворился в темноте. Сьюзан ждала, вглядываясь во тьму и надеясь, что Стратмор если и пострадал, то не сильно.
Но… - Сделка отменяется! - крикнул Стратмор. - Я не Северная Дакота. Нет никакой Северной Дакоты. Забудьте о ней! - Он отключил телефон и запихнул за ремень. Больше ему никто не помешает.
Уран природный элемент, плутоний - искусственный.
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