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Log In Sign Up. Download Free PDF. The Business of Piracy in Somalia Sarah Percy. Download PDF. A short summary of this paper. The Business of Piracy in Somalia. IntroductionOnce considered largely an historical and swashbuckling curiosity, the serious international problems posed by piracy are once again at the forefront of international attention.
The remarkable growth in piracy off the coast of Somalia, combined with the threat it poses to commercial shipping and a worrying potential association with Islamist terrorism, has put the Somalia problem at the forefront of maritime policymaking around the world and generated increasing grist for the academic mill. This piece of policy thinking, stemming both from international navies and academia, is misguided.
It is not based on systematic examination of the patterns of Somali piracy and the incentives and disincentives for ending piracy in the region. In fact, the more stable the Somali situation, the better the business of piracy.
The impact of naval counter-piracy efforts is also ambiguous: the presence of the world's navies off the coast of Somalia has slowed the growth rate of attacks in the Gulf of Aden, but has diverted the pirates to new areas which are impossible to control.
Finally, in discussing "policy solutions" to Somali piracy, one must note that the 1 incentives to end it are skewed on all sides. The pirates, local governors, the navies and the insurance industry have an interest in the continuation of piracy, and it may well be that international community has less incentive to stop piracy than it is willing to admit, no matter how serious the problem appears.
There is no doubt that Somali piracy is serious and growing. Data from the International Maritime Bureau reveals that there were 22 pirate attacks in , rising to in and in the first half of alone.
The shipping corridor off the coast of Somalia is strategically crucial and economically important. Piracy "and rising Islamic militancy have intensified US and European diplomatic interest in Somalia".
In , pirates hijacked the Ukrainian tanker MV Faina, along with its cargo of battle tanks, artillery shells and grenade launchers. Restoring Somali stability is an implicit or explicit goal of counter-piracy initiatives. Do they make a difference? And, perhaps most importantly, is it really true that the solution to Somalia's piracy problem lies in restoring order to Somalia?
We therefore statistically model piracy off the coast of Somalia to examine the following three main hypotheses:I. Naval intervention disrupts pirate activity and thereby lowers resources in the piracy business, slowing the growth rate of attacks. Naval intervention raises the perceived risks for pirates and therefore provides a significant deterrent effect. The effects of institutional failure in Somalia are conflicting: on the one hand, state failure allows pirates to conduct their illegal business unchallenged by government forces, but instability and uncertainty also make it more difficult to conduct any form of business.
While the navies correctly highlight their achievements in terms of deterring attacks on specific ships and in guarding food deliveries these are essentially short term, geographically limited successes. We find that pirates have extended their sphere of operation from the Gulf of Aden where shipping traffic and naval forces are concentrated into areas that are not easily monitored, such as the open waters off the coast of Somalia, the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean off the coast of Kenya, Tanzania and the Seychelles.
Secondly and paradoxically, stability in Somalia is correlated with an increase in pirate attacks. Our results show that pirates benefit from local improvements in governance, which can occur even without the presence of an effective central government. In other words, of the two solutions that international community has proposed naval intervention and the restoration of order to Somalia neither at the moment is likely to succeed. Moreover, the underlying lack of incentives to stop piracy -for pirates, for the insurance industry and for international naviesmay render most policy solutions useless.
The paper is structured as follows: In the first section, we briefly examine the evolution of statefailure, piracy and counter-piracy operations in Somalia. In the second section, we describe our model, estimation methodology and data.
In the third section, we statistically examine the general determinants of Somali piracy. In the fourth section, we examine to what extent the naval counterpiracy initiatives of the EU and NATO can be considered successful.
We use a combination of qualitative and quantitative approaches, confirming our statistical findings in interviews with naval officers, those involved in maritime risk services, and commercial shipping.
In the fifth section, we attempt to discover the links, if any, between piracy and the absence of authoritative government and lack of economic opportunities in Somalia. In the final section, we discuss the how our analysis sheds light on the various policy options currently mooted for Somali piracy, the particular pitfalls of the situation, and propose some solutions that reflect the key lessons we argue are visible from the data available on Somali piracy.
The Growth of Somali Piracy I. State failure in SomaliaSomali piracy has emerged from a cocktail of interrelated factors: the background of civil war and violence in the state, the failure of domestic and international efforts to create effective central governance in Somalia; poverty and displacement; and geographic opportunity. The tale of Somalia's gradual decline from corrupt dictatorship to civil war and so-called state failure, culminating in the UN intervention of the early s, is well-known.
The Gulf of Aden is a busy shipping route offering a tempting series of targets. Somalia then represents a perfect collision of means extensive small arms , motive poverty and opportunity lack of governmental authority and proximity to shipping for effective pirate operations.
History and Characteristics of Somali PiracySomali piracy began in the early s when local fishermen tried to push back foreign fishing trawlers. Counter-piracy and Pirate ResponseThere are now three multinational naval operations working to control piracy off the coast of Indian Ocean.
Attacking this far off-shore requires considerably more sophistication than previously associated with Somali pirates. The Royal Navy has noted the use of larger and better equipped motherships, which supply smaller vessels operating at some distance from shore, connected by satellite phones and GPS. These smaller vessels wait near known shipping routes, sometimes for days, to attack vessels. These attacks are better planned and less opportunistic than those immediately off Somalia's coast.
However, Royal Naval officers serving with Operation Atalanta have not seen evidence of the use of AIS 53 and point out that it is actually unnecessary, given the fact that ships traverse predictable routes through the Indian Ocean. Do pirate successes fuel further acts of piracy? How successful are naval counter-piracy efforts?
What links are there between stability and piracy? To answer these questions we model the drivers of piracy in the Gulf of Aden and off the coast of Somalia II. We look at opportunity, costs, risks, resources and poverty as the potent determinants of piracy.
We add variables on the activities of the international naval forces and local political developments to shed light on our research hypotheses.
We model piracy off the coast of Somalia from January to June Our initial hypotheses are the following: ial a Piracy is a function of risk: piracy will be lower during monsoon seasons and when there is greater law enforcement through international naval forces. We test a number of models, taking a general to specific approach to modelling. We begin by using a wide set of variables, and then test down to a specific model by eliminating insignificant variables.
In the results section we report the preferred specifications as well as commenting on the variables that were 55 Legal and jurisdictional weakness, favourable geography, conflict and disorder, under-funded law enforcement, permissive cultural environment and promise of rewards. We use a number of different geographical aggregations to shed light on the connections between piracy and its potential determinants.
From the narratives we can distinguish between successful raids, successful boarding with subsequent rescue and unsuccessful attempts diagrams 1 and 2. The latter includes incidents of various degrees of severity ranging from suspicious unidentifiable vessels spotted by radar 57 to actual attempts where shots were fired and boarding was attempted. The dependent variable is a count of the number of all the reported incidents in the relevant month.
There is a clear time trend in the data with overall piracy around Somalia and Aden increasing over time and the series also becomes more volatile diagram 1. There is no obvious impact from the naval counter-piracy missions building up through on the total number of incidents. However, during incidents off the coast of Somalia clearly increase, while the pattern in Aden remains comparable to the previous year. We note that it is likely that the dependent variable is measured inaccurately.
Attempted piracy is often not reported, because it is thought to reflect badly on shipping companies. Indeed the presence of the Navy makes skippers more likely to report suspicious vessels either to request help or to help with the counter-piracy effort. We model three series: firstly we model Somali piracy as one phenomenon. The reason for this approach is that while all attacks are presumed to be carried out by Somali pirates we want to check whether the factors explaining piracy vary between the two regions and whether pirates substitute between areas in response to naval patrols.
The dependent variable is a "count variable", with just under a third of total observations being zero observations-i. Diagram 3 shows the distribution of the variable, which is not in the classic shape of count data, due to a large number of zero observations and some observations with an unusually large number of events i.
The "suspicious" skiffs following large vessels may therefore have been either fishing boats or pirate vessels. We start with a basic OLS regression.
Below we report the results for the series with the logarithmic transformation, which shows a significantly better fit than the raw data series. There is a clear time trend in the data with overall piracy around Somalia and Aden and its volatility increasing over time diagram 1. We therefore include a lagged dependent variable in the model and we use robust standard errors to correct for heteroskedasticity. We check that the residuals do not exhibit a time trend and are normally distributed.
If we assume that the same process governs whether or not there is an attack and how many attacks occur when there is pirate activity, Tobit analysis is appropriate. Once again we used both raw data and a logarithmic transformation and report the results of the econometrically preferred logarithmic model below. Third, we use two estimation methods developed specifically for count data. These are characterised by a prevalence of zeros and small values of the dependent variable, which is also clearly discrete.
By taking these characteristics into account we are likely to improve on the linear model. Also, the zero observations are treated as a discrete choice, which is different from the positive number of decisions an individual makes once he has decided to carry out a specific activity.
However, its drawback in this context is that it assumes that the observations are drawn from a Poisson distribution, where the variance equals the mean. In the actual distribution the mean exceeds the variance.
We therefore also use the negative binomial model for count data as an alternative. This introduces an additional individual unobserved effect into the conditional mean. Such a pattern of waves are set up in the Gulf of Aden and 62 e. Modern pirate activity requires very different equipment from fishing.
The great processions were always preceded by an organ on a cart. Mother probably apologized to everyone present before running round the table to tend me. There was a reason for my condition and I was going to find out what it was. Repeating this operation twice resulted in a trail apparently made by six riders, and the big SAS man. A park, her hand desperately scrambling for his arm even as gravity and the wind tried to pull her down.
This "rutter for piracy" begins with a brief update on contemporary piratical incidents and a short review of books and collections of articles dedicated to the topic of piracy, before presenting the ground-breaking group of scholarly essays which make up WMU Journal of Maritime Affairs ' special issue on piracy at sea. Translated into English as the Rutter of the Sea in , it was reprinted many times, and remained the pre-eminent rutter used by English sailors for decades Footnote 3. From the mids to the s, piracy and armed robbery against ships were concentrated in the Far East, particularly the waters of the South China Sea and the Straits of Malacca. Between and , just when the number of Southeast Asian incidents started to wane, the centre of gravity, in terms of the number of attacks reported, shifted perceptibly to the Horn of Africa Mejia et al. The increasing number of incidents off the coast of Somalia is alarming and disturbing. The modus operandi employed by Somali pirates differs markedly from those found in the Far East.
PDF File: Dangerous Waters Modern Piracy And Terror On The High Seas - PDF-DWMPATOTHS 1/2. DANGEROUS WATERS MODERN. PIRACY AND.
The article describes the escalation of acts of maritime piracy emanating from the coast of Somalia, comparing them to the wave of aerial hijackings in the s and s in terms of demands, including political demands. The advantages for the pirates to gang up with land-based al-Shabaab terrorists are discussed and likely developments sketched. These usually highlights the more spectacular aspects of this form of maritime crime, such as the brazen modus operandi of the pirates, the parachuting of huge sums of money on the hijacked vessels, or the operations of naval special forces against some of the pirate gangs.
Черт побери, немедленно отключить.
Три… три… три… 238 минус 235. Разница равна трем. Он медленно потянул к себе микрофон. В то же самое мгновение Сьюзан опять бросила взгляд на руку Танкадо, на этот раз посмотрев не на кольцо… не на гравировку на золоте, а на… его пальцы. Три пальца.
Он не знал ни где он находится, ни кто его преследует и мчался, подгоняемый инстинктом самосохранения. Он не чувствовал никакой боли - один лишь страх. Пуля ударила в кафельную плитку азульехо чуть сзади.
- Кто-нибудь может мне объяснить, что это. ВАС МОЖЕТ СПАСТИ ТОЛЬКО ПРАВДА ВВЕДИТЕ КЛЮЧ______ Джабба не дождался ответа. - Похоже, кто-то очень нами недоволен, директор. Это шантаж. Больше всего похоже на требование выкупа. Слова Сьюзан прозвучали слабым, едва уловимым шепотом: - Это… Энсей Танкадо. Джабба повернулся и изумленно посмотрел на .
Я проделал анализ и получил именно такой результат - цепную мутацию. Теперь Сьюзан поняла, почему сотрудник систем безопасности так взволнован. Цепная мутация. Она знала, что цепная мутация представляет собой последовательность программирования, которая сложнейшим образом искажает данные. Это обычное явление для компьютерных вирусов, особенно таких, которые поражают крупные блоки информации. Из почты Танкадо Сьюзан знала также, что цепные мутации, обнаруженные Чатрукьяном, безвредны: они являются элементом Цифровой крепости. - Когда я впервые увидел эти цепи, сэр, - говорил Чатрукьян, - я подумал, что фильтры системы Сквозь строй неисправны.
У меня неотложное дело! - рявкнул Беккер. Он схватил парня за рукав.
Сирены по-прежнему выли. Пять секунд. Шесть секунд. - Утечка информации. - Никаких изменений.
Он застонал. - Джабба. Скорее вылезай.
Мидж, во-первых, там есть резервное электроснабжение. Так что полной тьмы быть не. Во-вторых, Стратмор гораздо лучше меня знает, что происходит в шифровалке в данный момент.
Book Review: Dangerous Waters: Modern Piracy and Terror on the High Seas. Show all authors. Kenneth McPherson. Kenneth McPherson. South Asia Institute.Ashley T. 10.06.2021 at 19:17
জলদস্যুতা - উইকিপিডিয়া; Dangerous Waters by John S. Burnett - Modern Piracy; Dangerous Waters - Forbes; Dangerous Waters: Modern.